Posts Tagged Banking

The Best Trader in the World Is Wildly Bullish on Gold

From Harley – Article worth your reading from one of the best, if not the best, traders in the world. Hope it helps you…

Taipan Daily: The Best Trader in the World Is Wildly Bullish on Gold

By: Justice Litle, Editorial Director, Taipan Publishing Group
Wednesday, November 04, 2009

The “Michael Jordan of trading” is now table-poundingly bullish on gold. And the Reserve Bank of India may have just made him look like a prophet…

John Paulson (no relation to Hank) is widely viewed as the most successful money manager of our times. Paulson made billions of dollars for himself and his investors by finding an obscure, non-public way to bet against the housing bubble. In terms of absolute dollar profit, his subprime crisis score is the largest ever.

Given his success, it is notable that Paulson is now quite bullish on gold. The Paulson Funds have heavy exposure to gold and gold stocks, and even offer an investment vehicle with payouts denominated in gold.

But, for all that, John Paulson is more of an investor than a trader. A trader, in the purist sense of the word, is an opportunistic mercenary type… someone who can raid most any asset class – stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies – and walk away with armloads of cash.

A Trader’s Trader

That is what it makes it even more notable for Paul Tudor Jones – the ultimate trader’s trader, and arguably the most successful pure trader alive today – to be wildly bullish on gold.

Your editor has long been a fan of PTJ (Jones’ initials), seeing him as a sort of market mentor from afar. In the 80s and 90s, PTJ was known as the “Michael Jordan of trading.” After cutting his teeth in the commodity pits, Jones went on to trade most every asset class under the sun in his futures trading fund.

The track record is legendary. PTJ started out with multiple consecutive years of triple-digit returns in the 1980s. He then reputedly made $80 million to $100 million in the 1987 stock market crash… nearly doubled investors’ money again in the 1990 Nikkei crash… and went 20+ years overall with no losing years.

While some fund managers are happy to chat with the press, PTJ prefers to avoid the spotlight as a rule of thumb. After a documentary came out in the 1980s (appropriately called Trader), PTJ decided he didn’t want it out there and bought up all the copies. (You will never see him embracing the public eye.)

A Strong Vote for Gold

Hence the surprise when PTJ came out in his recent quarterly letter pounding the table for gold.

I have never been a gold bug,” Jones writes to his investors. “It is just an asset that, like everything else in life, has its time and place. And now is that time. The economic and political comparisons to the late 1970’s are too numerous to ignore.

The argument is backed up with chart comparisons like the one below:

Gold Reserve Assets

The top chart shows the dollar value of international reserve assets – that is to say, the total worth of central bank holdings around the world – in billions of dollars since 1970.

Over the past 39 years, international reserve holdings have skyrocketed from practically nothing to more than $8 trillion. Meanwhile, the percentage of those holdings counted as gold went from a whopping 70% or so in the late 1970s to near single digits today.

India Lights a Fire

Perhaps fitting, then, that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) lit a fire under gold and gold stocks yesterday, sending the yellow metal to nominal record highs. (To break the inflation-adjusted high, gold will have to crack $2,000 per ounce.)

“Gold jumped to a record,” Bloomberg reports, “after India’s central bank bought 200 metric tons of the metal from the International Monetary Fund, heightening speculation that there may be more official purchases.”

The RBI’s actions call to mind a Taipan Daily missive written back in February, “Why the IMF and Fort Knox Won’t Put the Hurt on Gold.”

You can reference the data table in that piece to get a sense of just how much buying the likes of India, China and other major players have left to do if they hope to bring their gold holdings up to snuff.

When asked to describe his competitive edge as a trader, Jones described it this way:

The secret to being successful from a trading perspective is to have an indefatigable and an undying and unquenchable thirst for information and knowledge. Because I think there are certain situations where you can absolutely understand what motivates every buyer and seller and have a pretty good picture of what’s going to happen…

With the yellow metal storming the barricades as I write, it appears PTJ’s instincts have set him in good stead once again.

Warm Regards,

Justice Litle,
Editorial Director, Taipan Publishing Group

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Justice Litle is the Editorial Director for Taipan Publishing Group and the e-letter, Taipan Daily, the free financial e-letter that introduces readers to breaking global trends and investment strategies.

Link to original article:  http://www.taipanpublishinggroup.com/taipan-daily-110409.html

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The Public Option in Banking: How We Can Beat Wall Street at Its Own Game

“A worthy read & one worth considering.  Like I’ve said repeatedly, we the people must take control of all our own finances in more ways than one.”  ~ Harley Hunter

The Public Option in Banking:
How We Can Beat Wall Street at Its Own Game

Ellen Brown
August 5, 2009

http://www.webofdebt.com/articles/public_option.php

President Obama has repeated his call for a public option in health care, in order to create some competition for the insurance companies and keep them honest. We the people need to call for a public option in banking, in order to create some competition for the private banks and keep them honest.

In Wall Street’s latest affront to the public trust, the nine mega-banks graced with $125 billion in taxpayer bailout money under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were reported last week to be paying out billions of dollars in bonuses to their executives. At least 4,793 bankers and traders received more than $1 million each in bonus payments, although it was one of Wall Street’s worst years on record. After months of investigating banker compensation, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo said on July 30, “The repeated explanation from bank executives that bonuses are tied to performance in a manner designed to promote (national economic) growth does not appear to be accurate.”

To say that it was an understatement would be an understatement. The bonuses paid to executives not only were not tied to national economic growth but were not even tied to some reasonable percentage of company profits. In fact they were generally greater than the net income of the banks. Morgan Stanley, for example, had $1.7 billion in earnings and paid $4.475 billion in bonuses. Goldman Sachs had $2.3 billion in earnings and paid $4.8 billion in bonuses. JP Morgan Chase had $5.6 billion in earnings and paid $8.69 billion in bonuses. JP Morgan’s largesse involved showering 1,626 of its favorite execs and traders with bonuses of $1 million or more. For most people, a “bonus” is a few hundred dollars at Christmastime. A million dollars is what you work a lifetime to try to save, and few people reach that goal. Even Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, which have been called zombie banks, paid $5.33 billion and $3.6 billion in bonuses, respectively — although they lost more than $27 billion each in earnings. The bar for merit is apparently so low that you’re entitled to a bonus if your zombie bank simply keeps breathing!

These blatantly inflated bonuses are just the last in a litany of abuses by those same profligate banks that nearly destroyed our economic system. If the derivatives on their books were “marked to market” (valued at what they would fetch on the market), the banks would be bankrupt, and their employees would be out of a job. Instead, they have been allowed to inflate the value of their “toxic” assets – and sell them to the U.S. government at the inflated value. Then they have taken the money they got from the government at these inflated prices and paid back the TARP money they received – allowing them to post inflated earnings and reward themselves with inflated bonuses! Many people feel that these bankers are thieves stealing from the public till who should be looking at jail time. But who is there to stop their parade of outrages? No one in Congress, the White House, or the news media is calling them on the carpet for it. As Senator Dick Durbin said recently, Wall Street owns Congress; and that is also true of the major media.

We may not be able to stop them, but we can join them. We the people need to play the bankers’ game ourselves. Even corporate giants such as General Motors and WalMart have now gotten into the banking game and are easing their credit problems by forming their own banks. The U.S. public sector is late to the party. States, counties, public universities could take the lucrative system the private banking industry has created for itself and turn it to productive use in the public interest.

Keeping the Banks Honest with Some Public Competition

In President Obama’s July 17 weekly address, he repeated his call for a public option in health care, in order to “increase competition and keep insurance companies honest” and to “put an end to the worst practices of the insurance industry.” The same call needs to be made for a public option in banking. In some countries, publicly-owned banks have operated alongside privately-owned banks for decades; and in those countries, the current crisis has served to show that public banks generally do a better job of serving the people and protecting their interests than their private counterparts.

In Canada, the trendsetter in public banking is the province of Alberta. Alberta’s publicly-owned banking system, called Alberta Treasury Branches or ATB, was initiated during the Great Depression to give the private banks a run for the public’s money. According to a government publication titled “These Are the Facts: An Authentic Record of Alberta’s Progress, 1935-1948”:

“The Treasury Branch system enables the people to pool their financial resources and to use these resources for their mutual benefit thereby enabling them to progressively free themselves from the stranglehold of the existing financial monopoly. These Treasury Branches provide effective competition for chartered banks thereby ensuring banking services at reasonable rates.”

From 1929 to 1933, the average annual income in Alberta had fallen from $548 to $212, a staggering 61 percent drop. Interest payments continued to bleed the farmers of cash, and taxes had increased. In 1935, Albertans decided they wanted a change and swept the Alberta Social Credit Party into power. In 1938, the system of Alberta Treasury Branches was set up literally as a branch of the provincial government. The stated goal of the ATB was to “provide the people with alternative facilities for gaining access to their credit resources.” Bankers initially scoffed at Alberta’s attempts to establish a competing economic system, but Albertans had high hopes and rushed to deposit their meager savings in the Treasury Branches. The government invested in the ATB only once, contributing $200,000 in 1938. That was all that was necessary, as the system was self-funding after that. By 1946, the ATB was turning an annual profit of $65,000. According to a booklet titled “Albertans Investing in Alberta 1938-1998,” by 1998 the ATB had remitted $68 million to the provincial government.

In India, public sector banks also operate alongside private sector banks. Privatization has made significant inroads into India’s banking system, but fully 80 percent of the country’s banks are still government-owned. Before the current crisis, neoliberals criticized India’s public banks for being oriented more toward serving the customer than turning a profit; but studies showed that the public sector banks were out-performing the private sector banks in terms of customer satisfaction. Today, when the credit crisis has hit the aggressive private international banks particularly hard, customers are fleeing into the safety of India’s public sector banks, which have emerged largely unscathed from the credit debacle. The public banks have been credited with keeping the country’s financial industry robust at a time when the private international banks are suffering their worst crisis since the 1930s.

In China, private-sector banking has also made some inroads; but state-owned banks still predominate. In a June 2009 article titled “The Chinese Puzzle: Why Is China Growing When Other Export Powerhouses Aren’t?”, Brad Setser noted that nearly all countries relying heavily on exports for growth have experienced major downturns and remain in the doldrums — except for China. When China’s external markets fell off, the government turned its credit machine inward to domestic development. Its state-owned banks engaged in a huge increase in lending, with local governments and state enterprises borrowing on a large scale. The result was to create a real fiscal stimulus that put workers to work and got money circulating again in the economy.

In the United States, the trendsetter in public banking is the state of North Dakota, which has owned its own bank for nearly a century. North Dakota is one of only two states (along with Montana) that are currently not facing budget shortfalls. Ever since 1919, North Dakota’s revenues have been deposited in the state-owned Bank of North Dakota (BND). Under the “fractional reserve” lending scheme open to all banks, these deposits are then available for leveraging many times over as loans. Other banks in the state do not see the BND as a threat because it partners with them and backstops them, serving as a sort of central bank for the state. BND’s loans are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) but are guaranteed by the state. North Dakota has plenty of money for student loans, makes 1% loans to startup farms, has the lowest unemployment rate in the country, and is generally not feeling the pinch of the credit crisis at all.

Theory and Practice: The Proof Is in the Pudding

A bank charter brings with it the privilege of creating “credit” simply as an accounting entry on the bank’s books. The flaw in the private banking scheme is that banks create the principal portion of their loans but not the interest, which is continually drawn off the top as profit. New borrowers must continually be found to take out new loans to create this extra profit, making private banking effectively a pyramid scheme; and like any pyramid scheme, it has mathematical limits. Today, those limits appear to have been reached. Personal and national debts have gotten so large relative to incomes that it is no longer possible to maintain the fiction of solvency. We soon won’t have the money even to pay the interest on our existing debts, let alone to incur new ones. Public banking does not suffer from that flaw, because interest is not drawn out of the system but is returned to the public coffers. Public banking is thus mathematically sound and sustainable.

That is the theory, but there is nothing so persuasive as putting it to the test. Like with the public option in health care, we need to pit the public banking option against the private banking option and see which works best. My money is on the public option.

Ellen Brown developed her research skills as an attorney practicing civil litigation in Los Angeles. In Web of Debt, her latest book, she turns those skills to an analysis of the Federal Reserve and “the money trust.” She shows how this private cartel has usurped the power to create money from the people themselves, and how we the people can get it back. Her earlier books focused on the pharmaceutical cartel that gets its power from “the money trust.” Her eleven books include Forbidden Medicine, Nature’s Pharmacy (co-authored with Dr. Lynne Walker), and The Key to Ultimate Health (co-authored with Dr. Richard Hansen). Her websites are www.webofdebt.com and www.ellenbrown.com.

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Option ARM Resets

Presenting the Most Profitable Event of the Next 2 Years

By Ian Cooper
Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

Investors are getting it. . .

In fact, they’re figuring out what the bullish talking heads of CNBC can’t—or won’t.

It’s what we’re calling the biggest profit opportunity of the next two years.

Of course, CNBC’s goons aren’t the only ones to miss it. . .

Remember when Richard Fuld told us the worst of the crisis was “behind us”?

Or when FDIC Chairman Sheila Barr said we were in the 7th inning?

Or when Morgan Stanley said we were in the 3rd?

See a pattern developing here?

You see, the worst is far from over. The President is aware of this. Even the director of the president’s National Economic Council believes the worst isn’t over, saying, “‘It’s very likely that more jobs will be lost. It would not be surprising if GDP has not yet reached its low.”

So, what is it CNBC bulls know that we don’t?

Nothing.  They’re pandering to the corporate elitists who sign their checks. And what they’re not telling brings us to…

The most profitable event of the next 2 years…

As we’ve been warning for months, the next phase of the real estate disaster is upon us. It’s just shifted from subprime to Option ARM.

And with many economists predicting unemployment will rise into the double digits, foreclosures will only accelerate, which will add to bank losses, which will add pressure to the financial system and broader economy.

The Fed is well aware of what’s coming. Why do you think they’re so desperate to pump up the economy before the next fiasco?

Truth is, the amount of debt wrapped up in these Option ARMs is much worse than that of subprime. And if the government or the banks fail to understand this, the second round we’ve been warning about will begin and banking instability will wreak havoc yet again.

Option ARM resets will be tougher for the economy to handle than subprime. And we will see greater numbers of bank failures, job losses, foreclosures, delinquencies, and economic hardships.

Honest.

Look at what the Wall Street Journal had to say this weekend:

For the third straight month, option adjustable-rate mortgages are generating proportionally more delinquencies and foreclosures than subprime mortgages, the scourge of the housing crisis.

A further acceleration of troubles among the loans could mean higher-than-expected losses for Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s own insurance fund.

“The realization of the issues related to option ARMs is just beginning,” says Chris Marinac, director of research at Atlanta-based FIG Partners.

The Year of Option ARM Resets. . . and Why There’s No Foreseeable Bottom.

Just as 2007 and 2008 were the years of subprime woes, this one will go down as the year of Option ARM resets (or adjustable rate mortgage resets). With billions in Option ARM resets in 2009 and 2010, this crisis is about to unleash a fury no one’s prepared for.

It won’t be as bad as subprime, of course. It’ll be worse.

resets2009
That’s because lenders created these ARMs with “teaser” features for borrowers, which included making lower minimal payments for the first few years before the loan reset to a higher payment schedule. And if that weren’t bad enough, there was another feature called “negative amortization,” which meant you weren’t paying back any principal.

In fact, with negative amortization loans, your loan balance increased over time. Incredulously, every time you made a payment, you owed the bank even more. These are the loans that allowed consumers to buy houses they couldn’t otherwise afford.

As for speculators, they may use negative amortization loans if they believe prices will increase at a fast pace. But with the opposite happening, they’re out of luck.

And the banks will be left holding the bag.

What should concern you is that about $750 billion worth of option adjustable mortgages (option ARMs) were issued between 2004 and 2007. . . and will begin resetting shortly. And banks like Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo are in for a rough ride, given their exposure to option ARMs.

Worse, as of December 2008, about 28% of option ARMs were delinquent or in foreclosure, according to reports. Compare that to the 23% default rate in September 2008. And nearly 61% of option ARMs originated in 2007 “will eventually default,” according to a Goldman Sachs report.

What will happen is this: many borrowers, if they haven’t already, will start throwing in the towel as they realize just how far under water they really are. And the likes of JP Morgan (JPM) could be heavily and negatively impacted.

One thing’s for certain. . . we’ll be paying for someone else’s mistake yet again.

Good Investing,

Ian L. Cooper
http://www.wealthdaily.com

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Get Ready for Inflation and Higher Interest Rates

The unprecedented expansion of the money supply could make the ’70s look benign.

By ARTHUR B. LAFFER

Rahm Emanuel was only giving voice to widespread political wisdom when he said that a crisis should never be “wasted.” Crises enable vastly accelerated political agendas and initiatives scarcely conceivable under calmer circumstances. So it goes now.

Here we stand more than a year into a grave economic crisis with a projected budget deficit of 13% of GDP. That’s more than twice the size of the next largest deficit since World War II. And this projected deficit is the culmination of a year when the federal government, at taxpayers’ expense, acquired enormous stakes in the banking, auto, mortgage, health-care and insurance industries.

With the crisis, the ill-conceived government reactions, and the ensuing economic downturn, the unfunded liabilities of federal programs — such as Social Security, civil-service and military pensions, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Medicare and Medicaid — are over the $100 trillion mark. With U.S. GDP and federal tax receipts at about $14 trillion and $2.4 trillion respectively, such a debt all but guarantees higher interest rates, massive tax increases, and partial default on government promises.

But as bad as the fiscal picture is, panic-driven monetary policies portend to have even more dire consequences. We can expect rapidly rising prices and much, much higher interest rates over the next four or five years, and a concomitant deleterious impact on output and employment not unlike the late 1970s.

About eight months ago, starting in early September 2008, the Bernanke Fed did an abrupt about-face and radically increased the monetary base — which is comprised of currency in circulation, member bank reserves held at the Fed, and vault cash — by a little less than $1 trillion. The Fed controls the monetary base 100% and does so by purchasing and selling assets in the open market. By such a radical move, the Fed signaled a 180-degree shift in its focus from an anti-inflation position to an anti-deflation position.

exploding money supply

The percentage increase in the monetary base is the largest increase in the past 50 years by a factor of 10 (see chart nearby). It is so far outside the realm of our prior experiential base that historical comparisons are rendered difficult if not meaningless. The currency-in-circulation component of the monetary base — which prior to the expansion had comprised 95% of the monetary base — has risen by a little less than 10%, while bank reserves have increased almost 20-fold. Now the currency-in-circulation component of the monetary base is a smidgen less than 50% of the monetary base. Yikes!

Bank reserves are crucially important because they are the foundation upon which banks are able to expand their liabilities and thereby increase the quantity of money.

Banks are required to hold a certain fraction of their liabilities — demand deposits and other checkable deposits — in reserves held at the Fed or in vault cash. Prior to the huge increase in bank reserves, banks had been constrained from expanding loans by their reserve positions. They weren’t able to inject liquidity into the economy, which had been so desperately needed in response to the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 and continued into 2008. But since last September, all of that has changed. Banks now have huge amounts of excess reserves, enabling them to make lots of net new loans.

The way a bank or the banking system makes new loans is conceptually pretty simple. Banks find an entity that they believe to be credit-worthy that also wants a loan, and in exchange for the new company’s IOU (i.e., loan) the bank opens up a checking account for the customer. For the bank’s sake, the hope is that the interest paid by the borrower more than makes up for the cost and risk of the loan. The recently ballyhooed “stress tests” on banks are nothing more than checking how well a bank can weather differing levels of default risk.

What’s important for the overall economy, however, is how fast these loans are made and how rapidly the quantity of money increases. For our purposes, money is the sum total of all currency in circulation, bank demand deposits, other checkable deposits, and travelers checks (economists call this M1). When reserve constraints on banks are removed, it does take the banks time to make new loans. But given sufficient time, they will make enough new loans until they are once again reserve constrained. The expansion of money, given an increase in the monetary base, is inevitable, and will ultimately result in higher inflation and interest rates. In shorter time frames, the expansion of money can also result in higher stock prices, a weaker currency, and increases in commodity prices such as oil and gold.

At present, banks are doing just what we would expect them to do. They are making new loans and increasing overall bank liabilities (i.e., money). The 12-month growth rate of M1 is now in the 15% range, and close to its highest level in the past half century.

With an increased trust in the overall banking system, the panic demand for money has begun to and should continue to recede. The dramatic drop in output and employment in the U.S. economy will also reduce the demand for money. Reduced demand for money combined with rapid growth in money is a surefire recipe for inflation and higher interest rates. The higher interest rates themselves will also further reduce the demand for money, thereby exacerbating inflationary pressures. It’s a catch-22.

It’s difficult to estimate the magnitude of the inflationary and interest-rate consequences of the Fed’s actions because, frankly, we haven’t ever seen anything like this in the U.S. To date what’s happened is potentially far more inflationary than were the monetary policies of the 1970s, when the prime interest rate peaked at 21.5% and inflation peaked in the low double digits. Gold prices went from $35 per ounce to $850 per ounce, and the dollar collapsed on the foreign exchanges. It wasn’t a pretty picture.

Now the Fed can, and I believe should, do what it must to mitigate the inevitable consequences of its unwarranted increase in the monetary base. It should contract the monetary base back to where it otherwise would have been, plus a slight increase geared toward economic expansion. Absent this major contraction in the monetary base, the Fed should increase reserve requirements on member banks to absorb the excess reserves. Given that banks are now paid interest on their reserves and short-term rates are very low, raising reserve requirements should not exact too much of a penalty on the banking system, and the long-term gains of the lessened inflation would many times over warrant whatever short-term costs there might be.

Alas, I doubt very much that the Fed will do what is necessary to guard against future inflation and higher interest rates. If the Fed were to reduce the monetary base by $1 trillion, it would need to sell a net $1 trillion in bonds. This would put the Fed in direct competition with Treasury’s planned issuance of about $2 trillion worth of bonds over the coming 12 months. Failed auctions would become the norm and bond prices would tumble, reflecting a massive oversupply of government bonds.

In addition, a rapid contraction of the monetary base as I propose would cause a contraction in bank lending, or at best limited expansion. This is exactly what happened in 2000 and 2001 when the Fed contracted the monetary base the last time. The economy quickly dipped into recession. While the short-term pain of a deepened recession is quite sharp, the long-term consequences of double-digit inflation are devastating. For Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke it’s a Hobson’s choice. For me the issue is how to protect assets for my grandchildren.

Mr. Laffer is the chairman of Laffer Associates and co-author of “The End of Prosperity: How Higher Taxes Will Doom the Economy — If We Let It Happen” (Threshold, 2008).

Please add your comments to the Opinion Journal forum.
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A15

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Exploding Debt Threatens America

by John Taylor
Published: May 26 2009 20:48 | Last updated: May 26 2009 20:48

Standard and Poor’s decision to downgrade its outlook for British sovereign debt from “stable” to “negative” should be a wake-up call for the US Congress and administration. Let us hope they wake up.

Under President Barack Obama’s budget plan, the federal debt is exploding. To be precise, it is rising – and will continue to rise – much faster than gross domestic product, a measure of America’s ability to service it. The federal debt was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 2008; the Congressional Budget Office projects it will increase to 82 per cent of GDP in 10 years. With no change in policy, it could hit 100 per cent of GDP in just another five years.

“A government debt burden of that [100 per cent] level, if sustained, would in Standard & Poor’s view be incompatible with a triple A rating,” as the risk rating agency stated last week.

I believe the risk posed by this debt is systemic and could do more damage to the economy than the recent financial crisis. To understand the size of the risk, take a look at the numbers that Standard and Poor’s considers. The deficit in 2019 is expected by the CBO to be $1,200bn (€859bn, £754bn). Income tax revenues are expected to be about $2,000bn that year, so a permanent 60 per cent across-the-board tax increase would be required to balance the budget. Clearly this will not and should not happen. So how else can debt service payments be brought down as a share of GDP?

Inflation will do it. But how much? To bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to the same level as at the end of 2008 would take a doubling of prices. That 100 per cent increase would make nominal GDP twice as high and thus cut the debt-to-GDP ratio in half, back to 41 from 82 per cent. A 100 per cent increase in the price level means about 10 per cent inflation for 10 years. But it would not be that smooth – probably more like the great inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s with boom followed by bust and recession every three or four years, and a successively higher inflation rate after each recession.

The fact that the Federal Reserve is now buying longer-term Treasuries in an effort to keep Treasury yields low adds credibility to this scary story, because it suggests that the debt will be monetised. That the Fed may have a difficult task reducing its own ballooning balance sheet to prevent inflation increases the risks considerably. And 100 per cent inflation would, of course, mean a 100 per cent depreciation of the dollar. Americans would have to pay $2.80 for a euro; the Japanese could buy a dollar for Y50; and gold would be $2,000 per ounce. This is not a forecast, because policy can change; rather it is an indication of how much systemic risk the government is now creating.

Why might Washington sleep through this wake-up call? You can already hear the excuses.

“We have an unprecedented financial crisis and we must run unprecedented deficits.” While there is debate about whether a large deficit today provides economic stimulus, there is no economic theory or evidence that shows that deficits in five or 10 years will help to get us out of this recession. Such thinking is irresponsible. If you believe deficits are good in bad times, then the responsible policy is to try to balance the budget in good times. The CBO projects that the economy will be back to delivering on its potential growth by 2014. A responsible budget would lay out proposals for balancing the budget by then rather than aim for trillion-dollar deficits.

“But we will cut the deficit in half.” CBO analysts project that the deficit will be the same in 2019 as the administration estimates for 2010, a zero per cent cut.

“We inherited this mess.” The debt was 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 1988, President Ronald Reagan’s last year in office, the same as at the end of 2008, President George W. Bush’s last year in office. If one thinks policies from Reagan to Bush were mistakes does it make any sense to double down on those mistakes, as with the 80 per cent debt-to-GDP level projected when Mr Obama leaves office?

The time for such excuses is over. They paint a picture of a government that is not working, one that creates risks rather than reduces them. Good government should be a nonpartisan issue. I have written that government actions and interventions in the past several years caused, prolonged and worsened the financial crisis. The problem is that policy is getting worse not better. Top government officials, including the heads of the US Treasury, the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission are calling for the creation of a powerful systemic risk regulator to reign in systemic risk in the private sector. But their government is now the most serious source of systemic risk.

The good news is that it is not too late. There is time to wake up, to make a mid-course correction, to get back on track. Many blame the rating agencies for not telling us about systemic risks in the private sector that lead to this crisis. Let us not ignore them when they try to tell us about the risks in the government sector that will lead to the next one.

The writer, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of ‘Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis’

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

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